Week 5 Response Paper: Cultural and Group Rights

In the case that a liberal state’s recognition of the rights of a group clashes with its protection of liberal precepts, Barry’s proposal adds greater depth to those of Okin and Kymlicka, in that he establishes as a condition for government intervention, the extent to which a group protects its members’ right of exit (Barry 158). For Okin, the establishment of special group rights to protect minority ways of life is foundational to a multicultural society. This protection should not trump the basic rights of individuals, lest a “double standard” be applied to minority groups, in which their members are not guaranteed the same rights promised to all other citizens in a nation (Okin 19). Ultimately, she urges that states take into consideration “the urgency of…representing less powerful members of [minority] groups” in the enactment of group’s autonomy (23). Kymlicka takes the argument one step further by suggesting that the main goal of protecting group rights is to ensure the development of individual self-respect and an opportunity for meaningful individual choice within one’s own cultural context, therefore justifying the granting of special rights only to internally liberal cultural groups. For Kymlicka and Okin then, the state holds great responsibility in the preservation of the basic human rights of individuals, regardless of their membership in a minority group protected by the state.

This discussion fails to address the existence of the freedom of exit and entry within a group, which Barry emphasizes as the determining factor in the balance of power between a state and its internal communities. According to Barry, states are in effect prohibited from interfering with the illiberal internal practices of a minority group, so long as it is a “voluntary association” which members join and can exit at any time of their own free will (Barry 158). Barry’s opinion is made clear through his reference to a case involving the Church of Christ, in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court intervened in the actions of the Church, only on the grounds that the institution had “impose[d] their will on the unwilling” (159). Barry raises a valid point that is not discussed but essential to Okin and Kymlicka’s establishment of a policy concerning the sovereignty of a minority with illiberal policies. However, his argument also allows for minority groups to exploit their legal status: inherently illiberal groups such as the Orthodox Jews could easily institute laws so burdensome as to offset the nominal right to exit, trapping the members in a situation in which the state is powerless to intervene (159). In the enactment of group rights and privileges, it will thus be the responsibility of the state not only to analyze the group’s adherence to the state’s liberal norms as suggested by Okin and Kymlicka, but also to assess the minority’s actual preservation of the freedom of exit. Only then can the special rights of minority groups, fundamental to multiculturalism, be effectively balanced with the ability of the state to guarantee equal rights and protection to all.

• To what extent can states inspect the practices of minority groups to ensure that private/informal subordination of women is not occurring?
• If a nation as a whole possesses the illiberal characteristics that the authors attribute to minority groups, does the international community have the responsibility/ability to intervene? In this case, can the right to leave/return to a country be seen as parallel to the discussed freedom of exit?